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FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO
LANDMARK PRESERVATION STATUTES
I. Introduction
A significant constitutional conflict has developed between the free
exercise of religion' and the application of landmark preservation
statutes to religious properties. 2 An example of this debate is the recent
3
controversy generated by St. Bartholomew's Episcopal Church's
plan 4 to develop a fifty-nine story skyscraper adjacent to the landmarked church and above the parish community house. 5 It is estimated that this project could produce annual revenues of $9.5 million
for the church in the first ten years. 6 These proceeds would be designated by the church to further its urban ministries and attempt to
satisfy certain overwhelming religious and social needs of New York
City. 7 The project, however, would be impermissible according to the

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." This federally guaranteed freedom has been applied to the States and local governments through the
fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

2. See generally

COMMITTEE OF RELIGIoUs LEADERS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERFAITH COMMISSION TO STUDY THE LANDMARKING

7-8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as

oF RELI-

The Interfaith
Commission was established in 1980 by the Committee of Religious Leaders of the
City of New York (comprised of Protestants, Roman Catholics and Jews) in response
to a specific request by the Episcopal Diocese of New York to study the issues raised
regarding the landmark designation of the Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew
(United Methodist), id. at 39, despite the objections of the congregation. Id. at 18.
3. St. Bartholomew's Episcopal Church, 109 E. 50th Street, New York, New York.
4. "[T]he proposal appears certain to set off a major political, theological and
legal battle that both opponents and supporters of development have vowed to carry
to the United States Supreme Court if necessary." N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at Al,
col. 2. "Not since the Penn Central railroad tried to put a skyscraper atop Grand
Central Terminal has a land-use issue in midtown Manhattan ignited such passions as
the proposal to sell off some of St. Bartholomew's Episcopal Church on Park Avenue
for the construction of an office tower." Id., Oct. 30, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
5. St. Bartholomew's is located on Park Avenue on a plot described as "the last
piece of land on the city's premier commercial boulevard not now occupied by
commercial real estate." Id. The church was designated a New York City Landmark
in 1967. NEW YORK CITY LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION, DESIGNATION REPORT LP-02 7 5, No. 1 (1967). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at D27, col. 2.
6. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at Al, col. 4. The yearly earnings were projected to
increase after the initial ten year period. Id., at D27. col. 1.
7. Brenner, Holy War on Park Avenue: The Great St. Bartholomew's Landmark
Battle, NEW YORK MAG., Dec. 14, 1981, at 34, 36. Some activities in which St.
Bartholomew's currently engages are "daily noontime services, a celebrated music
series, theology classes, a kindergarten, [and] meetings of Alcoholics AnonyGIOUS PROPERTY

mous . .

.

. Id.

INTERFAITH REPORT].

St. Bartholomew's also provides food and clothing for anyone in
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existing New York City landmarks law which states that "it shall be
unlawful for any person in charge of a landmark site . . .to alter,
reconstruct or demolish [any such site] unless the [New York City
Landmarks Preservation] Commission has previously issued ... a
certificate of appropriateness or a notice to proceed authorizing such
work ....
8 The resulting controversy presents a dramatic setting
for an analysis of how the application of the landmarks law can
thwart valid religious goals. 9
The religious leaders of New York City, deeply concerned with the
problems associated with the landmarking of religious properties,
commissioned an Interfaith Study' 0 to review the effect of landmark
status on local churches and synagogues. I The Interfaith Commission

need. Id. Reverend Thomas Dix Bowers (the current rector of St. Bartholomew's)
envisions "an Urban Training Center for the needy people of the Grand Central area,
the bag people, the homeless, and the desperate" as well as money for charities,
disaster victims, and for the use of the diocese. Id.
8. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0 (1976).
9. Many other religious organizations may be burdened similarly by the application of New York City landmark statutes. See note 11 infra. Approximately 125
religious properties have been listed as landmark sites by the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission. Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of
New York, A Guide to New York City Landmarks (1979 & Supp. March 23, 1982).
10. Bishop Stuart J. Wetmore of the Episcopal Diocese of New York commented
that the Interfaith Commission had initiated its study prior to the St. Bartholomew's
controversy. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1982, at B3, col. 7.
11. See INTERFAITH REPORT, supra note 2, at 15-21. The Interfaith Commission

cited eight specific examples in which the landmarks law has burdened religious
communities:
(1) Conservative Synagogue of Fifth Avenue, E. 11th St., Manhattan. (After a
proposal by the congregation to extend the existing building was endorsed by the
local community board, and thousands of dollars in fees paid to architects, the
Landmarks Commission arbitrarily criticized the plan. The plan must now be redrawn at additional expense and delay.).
(2) Spencer Memorial Presbyterian Church, Montague St., Brooklyn. (After the
congregation was dissolved, the church property was offered for sale. A prospective
purchaser submitted several plans to redevelop the interior of the church. All proposals were rejected by the Landmarks Commission, and the property was subsequently sold to a private developer at a greatly reduced price.).
(3) Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew, W. 86th St., Manhattan. (A congregation
burdened with excessive building repair costs had the opportunity to lease its land for
the construction of a high-rise apartment. The ground floor of the new building was
to be reserved for the congregation's use. Although properly zoned for such a development, the plan was thwarted when the Landmarks Commission designated the
building as a landmark in 1981.).
(4) The Village Church, Presbyterian, 13th St., Manhattan. (Upon the dissolution
of the congregation, the vacant building located in the Greenwich Village Historic
District was offered for sale and restored to the tax rolls in 1978. Three years later,
after having incurred heavy tax and management expenses, the Presbytery of New
York finally found a suitable buyer for the vacant building.).
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found that the prohibition against demolition or alteration effectively
destroys the value of the landmarked religious property. 12 In addition,
the Interfaith Commission stated that religious organizations are required to expend thousands of dollars of religious contributions to
maintain 13 these landmarks for the public benefit in accordance with
the regulations of the Landmarks Commission. 14 Furthermore, certain amelioratory provisions of the landmarks law which offset this
burden for commercial properties 15 do not aid non-profit organizations.16 The study concludes that the New York City landmarks law is
(5) St. Bartholomew's Church, Park Ave., Manhattan. See notes 3-7 supra and
accompanying text.
(6) Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim, W. 87th St., Manhattan. (As a result of owning a
landmarked building, this school bears a considerable expense for maintenance.
Unable to modernize, the religious and educational purposes of this school are being
threatened.).
(7) St. Paul's Roman Catholic Church, Warren St., Brooklyn. (Dwindling enrollment forced the parish to close its elementary school and consequently pay real estate
taxes on and maintain a vacant building. A contract to sell the building was signed in
1979 pending the approval of the Landmarks Commission. By the time the approval
was granted 18 months later, the plan had fallen through.).
(8) Grace Church School, Episcopal, 4th Ave., Manhattan. (A plan to replace an
old clergy house had been rejected by the Landmarks Commission. An alternative
plan eventually adopted has proven inadequate for the needs of the school.).

12. See

INTERFAITH REPORT,

supra note 2, at 10. The Commission argues that, if

buildings are to be saved for the public benefit because of architectural merit, the
government should condemn the building and pay full value to the owner. The
landmarks law, however, forces the landmark owner to bear the cost of preservation
for the public benefit. Id.
13. Id. at 8. Such costs include repair, maintenance, heating an "energy inefficient facility," and fees for architects and attorneys to represent the organization
before the Commission. Id. at 15. "The [landmarks] law destroys the hope of a
congregation that it can free itself from the crushing burden of maintenance and
heating of a structure which has outlived its useful life and can no longer serve the
purposes for which it was originally built." Id. at 22.
14. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 207-10.0 to -11.0 (1976) provides
that all landmark owners must maintain and repair the building and prevent deterioration. A question can arise as to what is minor work and what is alteration, id.
§ 207-1.0(q), and procedures including a hearing are often required before any work
can be done. Id. §§ 207-5.0 to -9.0.
15. Id. § 207-8.0. Owners of commercial landmarked property may request permission to demolish, alter or reconstruct by proving that they cannot earn a sufficient
return on their property. § 207-1.0(v) defines a sufficient return as six percent. When
an insufficient return is shown, the Landmarks Commission may allow a real property tax exemption or remission. Id. § 207-8.0(b), (c). The Landmarks Commission
may also recommend the purchase by the city of a "specified appropriate protective
interest" in the property. Id. § 207-8.0(g)(1). If neither of these plans is adopted, the
owner may then demolish, alter or reconstruct. Id. § 207-8.0(i)(5).
16. The tax exemption or remission provided by § 207-8.0(b), (c) is of no benefit to
religious organizations as they already receive a tax exemption. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 421 (McKinney 1972). Thus the mitigating effect of § 207-8.0(b), (c) benefits

only commercial owners. See also

INTERFAITH REPORT,

supra note 2, at 3.
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"unworkable and unacceptable" 17 as applied to religious organizations. Furthermore, the Interfaith Commission declared that the statute "violates directly the constitutional prohibition against governmental interference with the free exercise of religion .... .."s
The New York State Court of Appeals recently permitted the landmark designation of religious or charitable property1 so long as it did
not "seriously interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose. "20 The constitutional standard for the regulation of religious
organizations, however, requires a compelling state interest to justify
any infringement on the free exercise of religion. Such a burden will
be permitted only where the state cannot achieve its goals by another
21
means.
This Comment focuses on the constitutionality of landmark preservation statutes as applied to religious properties. Using New York City
as a model, this Comment will examine the problems presented by the
landmarking of religious properties. This Comment concludes that a
re-examination of the New York standard under the constitutional test
requires the resolution of whether the preservation of landmarks is a
compelling state interest sufficient to justify the burden of maintaining landmarks which has been placed on religious organizations.

17. INTERFAITH REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
18. Id.
19. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434
N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980). Landmark designation which prevented the demolition of the
Society's meeting house was upheld because it did not seriously interfere with the
charitable purpose, even though the congregation had planned to construct an
apartment building for investment purposes whose revenue would be used for charitable purposes.
20. Id. at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 925, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
21. The United States Supreme Court in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),.
upheld a "Sunday Closing" law despite the adverse economic impact it had on
certain Orthodox Jewish merchants whose religion prohibited their working on
Saturdays. The Court stated the test for determining whether a regulation violates
the free exercise clause as:
[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden.
Id. at 607. This test was further refined by the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), to require a "compelling state interest .. .[to] justif[y] the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right." Id. at 406. See also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish exempt from compulsory education requirements
due to religious objections).
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II. The New York City Landmarks Preservation
Law As Applied to the Religious Community

A. The Landmark Designation Process
The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (Landmarks Commission) was created in 196522 to "effect and accomplish
the protection, enhancement and perpetuation of such improvements
and landscape features and of districts which represent or reflect
elements of the city's cultural, social, economic, political and archi23 While the Landmarks Commission does not
tectural history ....
have zoning authority, 24 it may regulate and restrict2 5minor work,
alteration, construction and demolition of a landmark.
The landmark designation process involves an administrative determination of whether a proposed building or area merits protection
from alteration or demolition. 26 After a written proposal for designation has been made, a public hearing is conducted 27 at which the
owner of the subject property and others may present testimony regarding the proposed designation. 2 Following the hearing, the Landmarks Commission may designate the property as a landmark, effective immediately.2 9 A copy of the designation is then filed with the
New York City Board of Estimate, which may approve or disapprove
within ninety days.30 If no disapproval or modification is forthcom22. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976 & Supp.
1981-1982).
23. Id. § 205-1.0(b)(a).
24. Id. § 207-3.0(a).
25. Id. § 207-3.0(b).
26. Id. § 207-2.0.
27. Id. Although notice is required, failure to give notice will not invalidate the
designation hearing. Id. § 207-12.0(a). The hearing need not be held before the full
Landmarks Commission, but rather, the Commission may delegate the power to
conduct a hearing to any member or members. Id. § 207-12.0(c). For a discussion of
the lack of procedural safeguards in the New York City designation procedure, see
Comment, Beyond the Taking Issue: Emerging Procedural Due Process Issues In
Local Landmark PreservationPrograms, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441 (1982). See also
Historic Greensprings, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Federal
landmarking of Green Springs, Virginia Historical District was void for lack of
adequate notice); K. DAvIs, ADMINISTaATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 5:10, 7:26 & 8:4
(Supp. 1982).
28. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-12.0(b) (1976). However, the
Landmarks Commission, in its discretion, need not be confined to such testimony.
Id. That the Landmarks Commission is free to disregard the objections of the
property owner calls into question the effectiveness of the public hearing.
29. Id. § 207-2.0(b), (e).
30. Id. § 207-2.0(g)(1), (2). A copy of the designation is also filed with the New
York City Department of Buildings, the City Planning Commission, the Board of
Standards and Appeals, the Fire Department and the Health Services Administration. Id. § 207-2.0(f). The statute does not require that the Board of Estimate review
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ing, the designation becomes final.3 Once the property is granted
landmark status, its owner must comply with the maintenance and
repair provisions set forth by the Landmarks Commission,3 2 or face
criminal penalties. 33 Similarly, the landmark owner is subject to criminal reprisals if alteration, reconstruction or demolition is attempted
34
without the consent of the Landmarks Commission.
To remove the effect of a landmark designation (de-landmarking),
two different standards may apply. The owner of commercial property must request a Certificate of Appropriateness authorizing demolition, alteration or reconstruction based on the grounds of insufficient
economic return. 35 The de-landmarking of non-commercial charitable
or religious property, however, requires a showing by the owner that
there is a contract to sell or to lease the property for at least twenty
years. 36 In addition the property must be shown to be unable to earn a
37
reasonable return, comparable to that of commercial properties.
Finally, the building must no longer be suitable for the owner's purpose or for the purpose for which it was originally used. 38 If these
conditions are met, the Commission shall endeavor to obtain a purchaser or tenant who will occupy the premises as a landmark, and not
seek to alter or demolish the structure.39 If such a purchaser or tenant
cannot be found, the Landmarks Commission may recommend that

or approve the designation, but only that it may modify or disapprove. Id. § 2072.0(g)(2). For a criticism of the Board of Estimate review of landmark designations
see Richland, The Case for Tightening the Reins on Landmarking, N.Y. Times, Feb.

21, 1982, § 8, at 1, col. 3; INTERFAITH REPORT, supra.note 2, at 29.
31. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0 (1976 & Supp. 1981-1982).
32. Id. §§ 207-10.0 to -11.0.
33. Id. § 207-16.0.
34. Id. The landowner may seek a Certificate of No Effect where the alteration
would not affect the protected architectural features of the structure. Id. § 207-5.0.
Alternatively, the landowner may apply for a Certificate of Appropriateness where
the proposed work would be consistent with and appropriate for the goals of the
preservation of the landmark. Id. § 207-6.0. Also, the landowner may seek a permit
authorizing minor work for such repairs that are so insignificant that no construction
permit would ordinarily be required. Id. § 207-9.0. For all three applications the
Landmarks Commission has complete discretion to grant or deny the request. Although each application is required to be acted on within a specified number of days,
the landowner may not begin such work until a determination has been made.
35. Id. § 207-8.0; see note 15 supra.
36. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0(a)(2)(a) (1976). The owner
may not develop the property and retain ownership of it. INTERFAITH REPORT, supra
note 2, at 32.

37.

NEW YORK,

N.Y.,

ADMIN. CODE ch.

38. Id. § 207-8.0(a)(2)(c).
39. Id. § 207-8.0(i)(1).

8-A, § 207-8.0(a)(2)(b) (1976).
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the city acquire a "specified appropriate protective interest
property.

' 40

in the

B. The Effect of Landmark Designation on
Religious Organizations
While owners may welcome the landmark designation of their
property as an honor, 4' the designation of religious properties creates
serious problems for many religious organizations. The vague standards used by the Landmarks Commission in determining landmark
43
significance 42 the high economic cost of maintaining a landmark
and the previously mentioned lack of compensation for tax exempt
non-commercial landmark owners 44 are substantial burdens imposed
on the religious community.

1. Standards
The landmarks law defines a landmark as: "Any improvement, any
part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a special character
or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation .... -45 Religious properties easily satisfy this standard because
churches and synagogues by their nature are designed to be architecturally distinctive. 46 The Landmarks Commission is free to apply this
vague standard liberally over any objections made by the landowner. 47 Another problem generated by the broad definition of a
40. Id. § 207-8.0(i)(4)(a). Note that rather than condemning the entire structure
and paying full value to the owner, the city can accomplish the same result by
purchasing the restrictive protective interest. INTERFAITH REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.
41. INTERFAITH REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. There may also be an economic benefit
to owners of property located in an historical district through increased business and
tourism, The real estate tax exemption also provides compensation to these landmark
owners. See note 15 supra.
42. See notes 45-52 infra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 53-56 infra and accompanying text.
44. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
45. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-1.0(n) (1976).
46. INTERFAITH REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, 8-9.
One might consider the situation if the landmarks law had been in effect
at the turn of the century: the City would now be studded with useless
religious buildings from Wall Street through midtown and to the upper
reaches of Manhattan. Not only would these buildings be occupying land
needed for other uses, but they would be draining religious resources in
ways that would undermine ministry and service to the people of our
community.
Id. at 21.
47. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-12.0(b) (1976).
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landmark is that the statute, as presently applied to churches and
synagogues, is often used for zoning purposes despite the specific
prohibition in the landmark statute against such use. 48 Religious properties frequently occupy under-developed parcels in relatively congested areas. 4 Applying the general language of the landmarks standard to religious properties effectively blocks any further development
in the area.50 Many who oppose the development of St. Bartholomew's, for example, have admitted their primary concern is the effect
the proposed tower will have on the local environment. 5' These are
zoning concerns and are not within the province of the Landmarks
Commission 52
2. Maintenance
Another problem which arises when churches and synagogues become landmarks is that they are forced to expend religious contributions to comply with the maintenance and repair regulations of the
Landmarks Commission. 53 The Interfaith Commission has found that
"[i]n forcing religious organizations to expend their charitable funds
for the maintenance of outmoded and inadequate buildings, the City
government is, in fact, directing the Church and Synagogue on how it
is to use its resources which have been contributed for its religious
54
ministry, not for architectural preservation."
Although religious organizations may apply for federal grants from
the Historic Preservation Fund,55 it is doubtful that these grants would

48. Id. § 207-3.0(a). The Landmarks Commission may not "limit the height and
bulk of buildings . . .regulate and determine the area of yards, courts and other
open spaces [or] . . .regulate density of population ...." Id. See also Gumley v.
Nantucket Bd. of Selectmen, 371 Mass. 718, 724-25, 358 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (1977).
(The Nantucket Historic District Commission lacked the authority to reject a residential development plan on the grounds of interference with the "'open space' aspect of
Nantucket.")
49. See notes 5 & 9 supra.
50. INTERFAITH REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
51. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1981, at A26, col. 1. This article discusses the effect of
the proposed development on light, open space and congestion on Park Avenue. Id.
52. See note 48 supra.
53. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.

54.

INTERFAITH REPORT, supra note

2, at 4.

55. 16 U.S.C. § 470(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Memorandum from James D.
Webb, Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, to the Director, Heritage
Conservation and Recreation Service, on Historic Preservation Grants for Renovation
of Church Properties (March 6, 1979), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW

287-302 (N.A. Robinson ed. 1980). See also Robinson,

Historic PreservationLaw: The Metes and Bounds of a New Field, 1 PACE L.
511, 558-59 (1981).

REV.
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meet the constitutional test regarding the first amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion. 5 Also, the tentative nature
of federal grants and the increasing costs of heating and maintenance
make it unlikely that the Historic Preservation Fund could alleviate
any of the economic burdens presently imposed on religious organizations.
The indefinite standards of the landmarks law and the distinctiveness of religious structures result in the landmarking of many religious
properties, often for zoning purposes. Additionally, the mandatory
diversion of religious funds to landmark maintenance and the removal
of a congregation's discretion to determine the fate of its house of
worship constitute an interference with the free exercise of religion. As
a result, when religious organizations challenge the landmarks law,
first amendment issues arise which must be addressed and resolved by
the courts. In applying the landmarks law to religious properties,
however, the New York courts have not considered these first amendment problems.
III. Judicial Application of Landmarks Preservation
Statutes to Religious Properties
A. Application to Commercial Property
If a commercial property owner can demonstrate that landmark
status destroys the reasonable use of the property, the designation will
be removed.5 7 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
56. See note 1 supra. The constitutional test as stated by the Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1976) is: "[f]irst, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . finally, the statute must not foster an
'excessive government entanglement with religion' " (citations omitted). See generally Robinson, supra note 55, at 558-59.
57. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). This
case has been the subject of considerable commentary. See Conrad & Merriam,
Compensation in TDR Programs: Grand Central Terminal and the Search for the
Holy Grail, 56 U. DE-r. J. URB. L. 1 (1978); Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central
Terminal Decision: A "Euclid" for Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and A
Resolution of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731 (1978); Samuels,
After Penn Central: A Look Down the Track at ConstitutionalTaking, 8 REAL. EST.
L.J. 230 (1980); Comment, Alas in Wonderland: The Impact of Penn Central v. New
York Upon Historic Preservation Law and Policy, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317
(1978); Comment, Grand Central Terminal and the New York Court of Appeals:
"Pure" Due Process, Reasonable Return, and Betterment Recovery, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 134 (1978); Comment, Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New
York: Landmark PreservationEludes the "Taking" Clause, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 317
(1978); Comment, Historic Preservation by Means of Landmark Designation. Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), 30 S.C.L. REV.
825 (1979); Note, Penn Central v. City of New York: A Landmark Landmark Case, 6
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City, 58 the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the New York City landmarks law. The Court held that the
landmarks law could prohibit the development of air space above
Grand Central Terminal. 59 Such a restriction, the Court ruled, was
not a taking without compensation in violation of the fifth amendment,6 0 because the property owner (Penn Central Transportation
Co.) was not denied the reasonable use of the building as a railroad
terminal."' It was also found that Penn Central could transfer its right
to develop above the terminal to surrounding properties which Penn
Central owned. 2 If the reasonable use of the commercial property has
not been entirely destroyed by the designation, the New York City
landmarks law also provides that commercial owners may alter or
demolish a landmarked structure upon a showing that the property is
63
unable to earn a reasonable return.

L.J. 667 (1978); Note, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York: Landmark Designation, Legitimate Preservation or Unconstitutional
Taking?, 25 Loy. L. REV. 205 (1979); Note, The Taking Issue-LandmarksPreservation Law That Severely Restricts the Use of Individual Historic Structures Does Not
Effect a Taking When There Remains a Reasonable Beneficial Use of a PropertyPenn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), 56 U.
FORDHAM URB.

DET. J. URB. L. 141 (1978).

58. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
59. Id. at 136-37.
60. The fifth amendment forbids that "private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
N.Y. CONST. art. I § 7(a) provides "[p]rivate property shall not: be taken for public
use without just compensation."
61. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-37. The Court in Penn Central applied the
balancing test of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal Co., the United States Supreme Court stated "that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." Id. at 415. In Penn Central, the regulation did not constitute a taking
because Penn Central could take advantage of its Transfer Development Rights
("TDR's"). 438 U.S. at 137. TDR's are the development rights possessed by a landmark owner which may be transferred to another property, allowing the transferee
to increase the size of his building. See J. CosToNIs, SPACE ADRIFr: LANDMARK
PRESERVATION AND THE MARKET PLACE (1974); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive

Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972);
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973). But see Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A
Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1976).
62. See note 61 supra.

63. Although the New York City landmarks law forbids reconstruction, alteration
or demolition without the prior consent of the Landmarks Commission, NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0(a)(1) (1976), if the owner can prove that the
property can not earn a reasonable return, id. § 207-8.0(a)(1)(a), then the alteration
may be permitted. Id. § 207-8.0.
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B. Application to Non-Commercial Property
The Appellate Division of The New York State Supreme Court has
recognized that the standards for commercial property owners cannot
be applied to non-commercial landmark owners. In Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harborv. Platt,6 4 the court announced the test for charities:
"[w]here maintenance of the landmark either physically or financially
prevents or seriously interferes with carrying out the charitable purpose," 6 5s the regulation will be considered invalid. 6° While the Sailors'
Snug Harbor test may be valid for charitable organizations, judicial
application of this test to religious organizations overlooks the strictures of the first amendment. The first amendment affords religious
organizations greater protection from governmental interference than
it provides the charitable property owner. The Sailors' Snug Harbor
test was developed in the absence of any first amendment issues. In
subsequent landmark preservation cases, the New York courts equated
charitable and religious organizations using the Sailors' Snug Harbor
test, and placed an inordinate emphasis on the taking analysis to
determine the validity of the landmarks law.6 7 The underlying first
amendment issues have been neither adequately addressed nor resolved by the New York courts.6 8 The United States Supreme Court
test for determining whether governmental regulation violates the free
exercise of religion 9 has not been employed.
1. Charitable Organizations
The constitutionality of the New York City landmarks law was first
tested in Sailors' Snug Harbor,7 0 which concerned the preservation of
64. 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967), rev'd, 29
A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968). See notes 65-77 infra and accompanying text.
65. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 29 A.D.2d at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
66. Id.
67. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d
305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); see notes 78-105 infra and accompanying text; Society
for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 68 A.D.2d 112, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1979),
aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980); see notes 106-33
infra and accompanying text.
68. Although the first amendment issue was stated in Lutheran Church, 35
N.Y.2d at 125 n.1, 316 N.E.2d at 308 n.1, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 11 n.1, it was not
discussed in the opinion. In Society for Ethical Culture, the New York Court of
Appeals said merely that the first amendment "does not entitle it [a religious organization] to immunity from reasonable government regulation when it acts in purely
secular matters." 51 N.Y.2d at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
69. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). See note 21 supra and notes 137-47
infra and accompanying text.
70. 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967), rev'd, 29
A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968).
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a charitable organization's 19th century Greek Revival buildings used
to house retired seamen. 7' The Appellate Division of the New York
State Supreme Court conceded the validity of using the police power
to regulate landmark structures.7 2 The court focused primarily on
whether in this instance the regulation went so far as to be considered
a taking.7 3 In its discussion of the taking issue, the court recognized
that the landmarks law sets guidelines for commercial property owners with regard to any "undue burden" 74 and allows for a reasonable
return.75 The court found that corresponding provisions for non-commercial, charitable owners provide relief only if the owner chooses to
sell or lease the property.7 6 Upon finding that the landmarks law
provided inadequate guidance regarding charitable properties, the
court established the Sailors' Snug Harbor test-if maintenance of the
landmark physically, financially or seriously interferes with the chari77
table purpose, the landmark designation will be overturned.
2. Religious Organizations
In Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 7 8 the New
York Court of Appeals applied the Sailors' Snug Harbor test to a
religious organization. 79 The court, by equating charitable and religious organizations, concentrated on the taking issue, thereby neglecting important first amendment considerations.

71. 29 A.D.2d at 377-78, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 315-16. Petitioner contended that these
old buildings were no longer suitable for the purposes of housing elderly men, and
therefore petitioner sought to replace them with modern structures. Id.
72. Id. at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
73. Id. For taking discussion see notes 57-62 supra.
74. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 29 A.D.2d at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
75. Id. Commercial owners who would earn less than a reasonable return on the
property may apply for a Certificate of Appropriateness authorizing alteration or
demolition. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 (1976). A reasonable
return is defined as six percent. Id. § 207-1.0(v).
76. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 29 A.D.2d at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316. See notes 36-38
supra and accompanying text.
77. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 29 A.D.2d at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The case was
remanded to answer the factual questions presented by the new test. Id. The City
subsequently purchased the property and it became the Sailors' Snug Harbor, Staten
Island Institute of Arts and Sciences. Landmarks Preservation Commission of the
City of New York, A Guide to New York City Landmarks 80-81 (1979).
78. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). See Note, Landmark
Preservation:The Problem of the Single Landmark-Lutheran Church in America v.
City of New York, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 160 (1975).
79. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 131, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
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Lutheran Church concerned the designation of a midtown Manhattan mansion which was the former home of J.P. Morgan, Jr.80 The
structure was built in 1853 and had been a residence until The United
Lutheran Church in America purchased it in 1942.81 Subsequently,
the Lutheran Church converted it to offices for the administrative
purposes of the church. 82 Prior to the enactment of the landmarks law
in 1965, the Lutheran Church considered demolishing the building in
favor of a new office building to better serve their needs. 83 The
designation of the building as a landmark precluded the planned
alteration. 84 The court conceded that the Landmarks Commission
would not approve a demolition.85 The court also noted that the
church as a religious organization could not benefit from the ameliorative provisions of the landmarks law. 86
The court then addressed the taking issue, despite the fact that the
lower courts had ruled solely on the issue of whether the structure was
of landmark quality. 87 In discussing governmental interference with
an owner's use of private property, 88 the court noted that there is
either compensable taking or noncompensable regulation. 89 The court
further stated that while similar land use restrictions such as zoning
regulations may be noncompensable, 90 they cannot be applied retro80. Id. at 125, 316 N.E.2d at 308, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 11. The structure was designated a landmark in 1965 because it was significant as "the residence of J.P. Morgan
Jr. during the first half of the twentieth century, . . . an early example of AngloItaliante architecture, . . . one of the few free standing Brownstones remaining in
the City . . . [and] is a handsome building of great dignity." Id. (quoting the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission).
81. Id. at 124, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 124-25, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11.
84. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0(a)(1) (1976). See notes 32-34
supra and accompanying text.
85. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 124, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
86. Id. See also notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
ameliorative provisions.
87. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 127-28, 316 N.E.2d at 309-10, 359 N.Y.S.2d
at 13.
88. Id. at 128, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
89. [E]ither the government is acting in its enterprise capacity, where it takes
unto itself private resources in use for the common good, or in its arbitral
capacity, where it intervenes to straighten out situations in which the
citizenry is in conflict over land use or where one person's use of his land
is injurious to others. . . . Where government acts in its enterprise capacity, as where it takes land to widen a road, there is a compensable taking.
Where government acts in its arbitral capacity, as where it legislates
zoning .. , there is simply noncompensable regulation.
id. at 128-29, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14 (citing Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63-64 (1964)).
90. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
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actively to prohibit an existing use of property 9' and are void if
confiscatory. 9 2 In so ruling, the court relied on a number of zoning
cases including Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,9 3 in
which it held: "[h]owever compelling and acute the community. . . problem may be, its solution does not lie in placing an undue
and uncompensated burden on the individual owner of a single parcel
of land in the guise of regulation, even for a public purpose. 9 °4 The
New York Court of Appeals in Lutheran Church also relied on Forster
v. Scott 5 and Keystone Assocs. v. Moerdler,9 6 wherein it held:
[i]t is not necessary, in order to render a statute obnoxious to the
restraints of the Constitution, that it must in terms or in effect
authorize an actual physical taking of the property or the thing
itself, so long as it affects its free use and enjoyment or the power of
7
disposition at the will of the owner.

The court applied these standards to the landmarks law because, as in
Forster and Keystone Associates, the record owner retained title and
use but the "free use was so severely restricted as to be confiscatory. " '98
The court then stated that the landmarks law may be unconstitutional
in certain situations, as in the present case where it deprives the
landowner of the reasonable use of the property.9 9 However, the court
refused to invalidate the law itself as unconstitutional because it held
that not all landmark designations are confiscatory.10 0

91. Id. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.03 (2d
ed. 1973) ("[z]oning ordinances which sought to affect such vested rights were
described as 'retroactive' and therefore invalid"). Id. § 6.03, at 169.
92. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
93. Id. at 129-30, 316 N.E.2d at 310-11, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15, (citing Vernon Park
Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954)). The court in
Lutheran Church also relied on Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township
of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), where under the guise
of regulation, the subject property was added to the municipality's resources.
94. Vernon Park Realty, 307 N.Y. at 498, 121 N.E.2d at 519.
95. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15,
citing Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
96. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15,
citing Keystone Assocs. v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d
185 (1966).
97. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15,
(quoting Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. at 584, 32 N.E. at 977, citing Keystone Assocs. v.
Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d at 88, 224 N.E.2d at 703, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 189).
98. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
99. Id.
100. Id. The landmarks law was held not to be confiscatory in Society for Ethical
Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980). See notes
106-33 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of Society for Ethical Culture.
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The court in Lutheran Church discussed Sailors' Snug Harbor and
stated that if "the owner can make a case for alteration or demolition
[based on the Sailors' Snug Harbor test], the municipality would have
to relinquish the designation, provide agreeable alternatives or condemn the premises."' 01 It was concluded that "to force plaintiff to
retain its property as is, without any sort of relief or adequate compensation, is nothing short of a naked taking."'' 0 2 In Lutheran
Church, the court found that the church met the Sailors' Snug Harbor
test because the structure was totally inadequate for the church's
administrative needs. 103 The landmarks law was found to be a serious
interference with the charitable use of the premises. 104 Thus, the court
in Lutheran Church relied on the taking analysis and never addressed
05
the first amendment issues presented.1
In a recent New York decision, Society for Ethical Culture v.
Spatt,108 the Sailors' Snug Harbortest was again applied to a religious
organization. 01 7 In Society for Ethical Culture, the designated property was not an office building as in Lutheran Church, but rather a
congregation's meeting house. 10 Moreover, in Society for Ethical Culture, the New York Court of Appeals, in a broad reference to the first
amendment issue regarding the free exercise of religion, concluded
that the first amendment does not grant "immunity from reasonable
0 claimed
government regulation". 0 9 The Society for Ethical Culture 11
that the designation of their meeting house as a landmark was both a
violation of the free exercise of religion and a taking."' The structure
was built in the early 1900's and was designed in the art nouveau style
of architecture." 2 The Society opposed the landmark designation at
3
the initial public hearing and later sought to annul the designation. "

101. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
102. Id. at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
103. Id. at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
104. Id. at 131-32, 316 N.E.2d at 311-12, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17.
105. Id. at 125 n.1, 316 N.E.2d at 308 n.1, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 11 n.1.
106. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
107. Id. at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 925, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935. In Society for Ethical
Culture, unlike Lutheran Church, the landmark designation did not interfere with a
charitable purpose. Id. at 455-56, 415 N.E.2d at 925-26, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935-36.
108. Id. at 452, 415 N.E.2d at 924, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
109. Id. at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
110. "The Society is a religious, educational and charitable organization founded in
1877 for the purpose of uniting interested persons to further the goal of nonsectarian
moral improvement." Id. at 452, 415 N.E.2d at 924, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 452, 415 N.E.2d at 924, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
113. Id.
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The Society contended that the designation was unreasonable, in that
there was insufficient evidence supporting the house's alleged historical and architectural significance. 114 The appellate division noted that
the trial court had found the designation "confiscatory, unconstitutional, arbitrary and unreasonable."" 5 The appellate division reversed the trial term and found there was a rational basis for the
6
designation. 11
The Society further contended that economic obsolescence justified
the building's demolition; it proposed replacement with a new center,
above which would be revenue generating apartments. " 7 The income
from this development would then be used by the Society for charitable purposes." 8 The appellate division questioned whether the landmarks law seriously interfered with the property's use" 9 and con20
cluded no such interference existed.1
In discussing the first amendment claim of the Society, the appellate division expressly refused to apply the language of Westchester

Reform Temple v. Brown.' 2' In Westchester Reform Temple, the

114. Id. at 453, 415 N.E.2d at 924, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
115. Society for Ethical Culture, 68 A.D.2d at 115, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
116. Id. at 117, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 250. The appellate division in Societyfor Ethical
Culture followed the New York Court of Appeals decision in Pell v. Board of Educ.,
34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1974), in determining that the
trial term's review of an administrative tribunal where there has been a hearing is
limited to whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding. The administrative finding must stand unless it is without a rational basis and is arbitrary and
capricious. In Society for Ethical Culture, the Landmark Commission's designation
was not arbitrary and capricious, but relied on the history of the Society (founded in
1876), the art nouveau style of architecture and professional opinions. 68 A.D.2d at
117, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50.
117. Id. at 119-20, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
118. Id. at 120, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
119. Id. at 119, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 251. The Court in Society for Ethical Culture
relied upon Sailors' Snug Harbor and Lutheran Church in applying the serious
interference test. Id.
120. Id. at 120, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 252. The appellate division also relied on
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962), which held that an
ordinance can deprive a property owner of the most beneficial use of the property
and not be unconstitutional. 68 A.D.2d at 121, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 252. Perhaps this
reliance is misplaced in that Society for Ethical Culture concerns a religious organization's right to the best use of its property as a means to further the religious
purposes of the congregation. In Goldblatt, an ordinance which prohibited any
excavation below the water table was upheld despite appellant's objections that such
excavation was the most beneficial use of his property. 369 U.S. at 592-96.
121. Society for Ethical Culture, 68 A.D.2d at 122, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 253 (citing
Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293
N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968)). In Westchester Reform Temple the New York Court of Appeals held unconstitutional a zoning regulation which effectively prohibited the
construction of a synagogue with added parking space.
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New York Court of Appeals noted that "[r]eligious structures enjoy a
constitutionally protected status which severely curtails the permissible extent of governmental regulation in the name of the police
powers .... "122 In distinguishing Westchester Reform Temple, the
appellate division stated that the Society sought not just a new facility,
but rather the right to develop its property as it desired.12 3 Neither a
religious organization nor a commercial property owner, the court
stated, is entitled to the most beneficial use of the property.12 4 The
appellate division thus concluded that the application of the landmarks law to the Society for Ethical Culture was not a violation of the
125
free exercise of religion.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's
ruling in Society for Ethical Culture.12 The court, citing Sailors' Snug
Harbor and Lutheran Church, enforced the landmark designation as
it found no serious interference with the charitable purpose.'2 7 The
court similarly equated charitable with religious organizations and
applied the taking analysis of Sailors' Snug Harbor.'2 The first
amendment issue was almost disregarded.' 29 Citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder,' 30 the court stated that "[a]lthough the Society is concededly
entitled to First Amendment protection as a religious organization,
this does not entitle it to immunity from reasonable government regulation when it acts in purely secular matters." 31 Despite citing Yoder,
the New York Court of Appeals failed to apply the United States
Supreme Court test for determining the validity of governmental
regulation of religion. 132 Correct application of Yoder in the landmarks context would require that courts determine whether the excessive regulation of religious organizations and the diversion of funds

122. 22 N.Y.2d at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
123. Society for Ethical Culture, 68 A.D.2d at 122, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
124. Id. at 121, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
125. Id. at 122, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
126. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
127. Id. at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 925, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936. The Court devoted only
one paragraph to the first amendment issue.

130. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
131. Society for Ethical Culture, 51 N.Y.2d at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 936, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a discussion of
Yoder, see notes 156-62 infra and accompanying text.
132. This Supreme Court test requires a careful scrutiny of any regulation which
infringes on the free exercise of religion. See notes 137-66 infra and accompanying
text.
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furthering the
away from the religious ministry can be justified by
"cultural and aesthetic benefit of the community." 133
IV. The Constitutionality of Landmarking
Religious Properties
The first amendment issue regarding the landmarking of religious
property was presented in both Lutheran Church in America v. City
of New York, 134 and Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt. 135 The
courts, however, relied primarily on the taking analysis (using the
Sailors' Snug Harbor standard) 136 and failed to consider adequately
the first amendment problems. The United States Supreme Court, in a
series of cases beginning with Braunfeld v. Brown, 137 has adopted a
balancing test to be applied when the government is allegedly violating the free exercise of religion. The test as stated by the Court in
Braunfeld is:
[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goal, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by
means which do not impose such a burden. 138
133. Society for Ethical Culture, 51 N.Y.2d at 454, 415 N.E.2d at 925, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 935. The New York Court of Appeals in Society for Ethical Culture
stated that "a government may reasonably restrict an owner in the use of his property
for the cultural and aesthetic benefit of the community," id., citing Cromwell v.
Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), and Sailors' Snug
Harbor, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968). However, the court
neglected to weigh the benefits for the community against the infringement on the
free exercise of religion: a test required by the United States Supreme Court. See
notes 137-66 infra and accompanying text.
134. 35 N.Y.2d at 125 n.1, 316 N.E.2d at 308 n.1, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 11 n.1.
135. 51 N.Y.2d at 452, 415 N.E.2d at 924, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
136. Lutheran Church, 35 N.Y.2d at 131, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16;
Society for Ethical Culture, 51 N.Y.2d at 454-55, 415 N.E.2d at 925, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
935.
137. 366 U.S. 599 (1961); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see generally Clark, Guidelines for the Free
Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV, 327 (1969); Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion:
A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REV. 679 (1969); Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder,
and Beyond: Alternativesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309; Riga,
Yoder and Free Exercise, 6 J. LAW & EDUC. 449 (1977); Comment, A Braunfeld v.
Brown Test for Indirect Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 48 MINN. L. REV.
1165 (1964); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of
Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980).
138. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
304-05 (1940)). The Court in Braunfeld also noted Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943), and Follet v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), where the Court
held that Jehovah's Witnesses "colporteurs" (itinerant ministers selling religious liter-
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In Braunfeld, the Court was faced with the question of whether
Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law 39 interfered with the appellants'
free exercise of religion. The appellants were Orthodox Jewish merchants whose religion required their abstention from work on Saturdays.140 Prior to the enactment of the law, these merchants were
allowed to remain open for business on Sundays in order to compensate for their closing on Saturdays. ' 4 The mandatory Sunday closing,
they claimed, would restrict their ability to earn a living. Moreover, it
would interfere with the free exercise of religion because the statute
forced them to either disobey their religious teachings or suffer great
economic loss.1 42 The Court in Braunfeld upheld the Sunday closing
law because it was enacted to advance a valid secular goal of providing one day of "rest, repose, recreation and tranquillity .... " 43 The
Court was not satisfied that any other means existed which could be
adopted to further the state's purpose. 144
The Braunfeld test is applicable to historic preservation statutes
because they are general laws which advance the state's purpose but
also impose a burden on religion. The application of the Braunfeld
test to the landmarks law 45 gives rise to three fundamental issues: (1)
whether the preservation of landmarks is a valid secular purpose, (2)
whether the burden placed on religious organizations is direct or
indirect and (3) whether the state may accomplish its purpose by
means which do not impose such a burden.
The purpose of the landmarks law is to preserve for future generations examples of significant architectural and historical buildings. 46
While historic preservation is a valid secular purpose, 47 it may not

ature) could not be compelled to pay a local peddler's tax. The Court held this license
tax unconstitutional as a direct tax on the free exercise of religion. Braunfeld, 366
U.S. at 607 n.4.
139. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4699.10 (Purdon 1960), presently codified at 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 7363 (Purdon 1973).

140. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 602.
143. Id. at 607.
144. Id. at 608-09. The Court stated that if it created an exception for appellants
and permitted their working on Sunday, those who remained closed on Sunday could
complain that their religions had been discriminated against. Also, others might feign
religious beliefs in order to close on a less profitable day, thereby being able to
remain open on Sunday.
145. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976 & Supp.
1981-1982).
146. Id. § 205-1.0(b).
147. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see
notes 57-63 supra and accompanying text.
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meet the Braunfeld test as it was further refined by the United States
48
Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.1
49
Justice Brennan, who concurred and dissented in Braunfeld,1
wrote for the majority in Sherbert and stated that there must be "some
compelling state interest . . . [to] justif[y] the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right." 51 0 The Court in Sherbert
considered the question of whether South Carolina's Unemployment
Compensation Act' 5 1 violated the free exercise clause. The appellant
was a Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemployment benefits
because she was unable to work on Saturday due to her religious
beliefs. 15 2 The Court in Sherbert distinguished Braunfeld based on the
fact that in Sherbert there was no compelling state interest which
necessitated the substantial infringement on appellants' freedom of
religion.15 3 Unlike Braunfeld, the Court in Sherbert found the appellant could be exempted from the eligibility requirement of the regulation. Thus, an alternative was available which did not burden the free
54
exercise of religion. 1
Application of the Sherbert compelling state interest test to the
landmarking of religious properties requires that a substantially
higher standard be met to justify the burden imposed on religious
organizations. It has not yet been determined whether the protection
of New York City's "cultural, social, economic, political, and architectural history"'155 is a compelling state interest, or whether that
interest would be defeated by exempting religious buildings.
The United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder156 discussed what state purposes would or would not justify an infringement on the free exercise clause of the first amendment. In Yoder,
members of the Old Order Amish contended that Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law 5 7 was "contrary to the Amish religion and
way of life." 158 The Court conceded the valid state purpose in the
148. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
149. 366 U.S. at 610. (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). In Braunfeld,
Justice Brennan stated that there was not such an overbalancing need for the Sunday
closing law so as to justify the substantial limit on the appellants' free exercise of
religion. Id. at 613-14.
150. 374 U.S. at 406.
151. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-1 to -404 (Law. Co-op. 1962), presently codified at
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-27-10 to -41-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1981).
152. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401.
153. Id. at 408-09.
154. Id. at 409.
155. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch.8-A, § 205-1.0(b) (1976).
156. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
157. Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1973 & Supp. 1981-1982).
158. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
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education of its citizens,159 but ruled in favor of the Amish. The Court
noted that despite the need for formal education, the values underlying the religion clauses of the first amendment "have been zealously
protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance."'' 10 The Court further stated that although religious activities may be regulated to "promote the health,
safety, and general welfare"' '61 of the community, "[a] regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion."'
The United States Supreme Court has continued to apply the
Braunfeld, Sherbert and Yoder tests requiring a compelling governmental interest to justify an infringement on the free exercise of
religion. In the recent case of United States v. Lee, 6 3 the Court
upheld the substantial governmental interest in maintaining the Social
Security system despite the objections of the Amish that their religion
64
also requires them to contribute to the support of fellow members.
The Court stated that the Social Security system could not function if
each religion were to seek an exemption from compliance. 6 5 Thus, the
infringement on the free exercise of religion was upheld because of the
high governmental interest in the program and the lack of any alternative means to further the government's purpose.166
V. Conclusion
Application of the United States Supreme Court first amendment
standards to the New York City landmarks law requires a determination of whether the preservation of landmarks is or should be considered a state interest so compelling as to justify the substantial burden
such preservation places on religious organizations. In determining
whether the state interest is compelling, courts must ascertain whether
other means are available to further the state interest in preserving
landmarks without infringing on the free exercise of religion. If such

159. Id. at 213.
160. Id. at 214.
161. Id. at 220, citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
162. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220, citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1979).
163. 102 S.Ct. 1051 (1982).
164. Id. at 1055.
165. Id. at 1056.
166. Id.
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means exist, the infringement on the free exercise of religion is invalid.
While the United States Supreme Court has approved the validity of
the New York City landmarks law as applied to commercial properties, 6 7 the court has yet to determine whether landmarks preservation
is a sufficient compelling state interest when applied to religious properties.
The New York courts, without fully addressing the first amendment
standard set by the United States Supreme Court, have approved the
validity of landmark regulations as applied to religious organizations. 6 8 In so doing, the New York courts have applied a lesser standard than the first amendment, determining solely if there has been a
taking without compensation, despite the fact that the New York City
landmarks law imposes substantial burdens on religious landmark
owners. 6 9 These burdens include the lack of standards which make
churches and synagogues easy targets for landmark designation, the
prohibition against alteration and development and the heavy economic costs of heating, maintaining and repairing these structures, all
of which amounts to a significant interference with the free exercise of
religion. 70 As a result, religious organizations are burdened for the
public benefit despite the contrary desires of the religious community.
Although these burdens may be unintentional and therefore indirect,
the regulations still must be carefully scrutinized applying the Supreme Court standards.
Furthermore, and also within first amendment analysis, a number
of alternatives are available to further the state's goal of preserving
landmarks. Among the options available are exemption of religious
buildings from landmark designation or proposed legislation providing for designation of religious properties only with the congregation's
consent.17 ' The government could also contribute financially to either
maintain or to purchase these landmarks outright. Considering these
alternatives, it is doubtful that a court would conclude that other
means are not available to further the state interest and thereby
render it compelling.
167. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128-29. See notes 57-63 supra and accompanying
text.
168. See notes 78-133 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Lutheran
Church and Society for Ethical Culture.
169. See notes 41-56 supra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 41-54 supra and accompanying text.
171. 10341 N.Y.S., 13043 N.Y.A., 205th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1982. This proposed
amendment to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977) has been supported by
the New York State Council of Churches and the Religious Leaders of New York
State and would not permit the landmarking of religious or charitable properties
without the consent of the religious or charitable organization.
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The New York Court of Appeals in Penn Central172 acknowledged
the great financial burden which would be imposed on the public
treasury were the government to pay the price of maintaining landmarks. The New York courts have ignored the fact that churches and
synagogues, with their limited resources, are also ill-suited to bear the
economic burden imposed on them for the public benefit.
While landmark preservation is important, it must be recognized
that the values underlying the religion clauses of the first amendment
"have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of
other interests of admittedly high social importance."' 173 To force
congregations to bear the burdens of landmark designation, without
either the consent of the congregation or financial compensation from
the government constitutes a violation of the free exercise clause of the
first amendment.
Stephen M. Watson

172. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), afJ'd, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
173. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.

